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Abstract. Policies are used extensively in managing the security of large
computer infrastructure systems. Many large organizations and several
government entities such as the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the North American Electric Reliability Corpo-
ration (NERC) define security policies to specify the allowed configura-
tions of the systems under their watch. The goal of such policies is to
help reduce the vulnerability of the infrastructure to attacks, misconfig-
uration and operator error. To that end, these policies specify allowed
interconnections between systems, firewall configurations, software set-
tings, and levels of redundancy in the system’s components. Ensuring
compliance to such policies through frequent monitoring can reduce the
time span during which these systems are vulnerable to attacks.
However, faults and attacks can make the underlying information
used for validating compliance erroneous or incomplete. A compromised
system could feed false information about its state to the compliance
monitoring system. In this paper we introduce the concept of robustness
of compliance. We show that systems which are compliant to security
policies can exhibit different level of resilience to false information and
we provide an algorithm for quantitatively computing a measure of ro-
bustness based on the concept of distance from violation. Intuitively, our
algorithm computes an estimation of the amount of false information
that needs to be provided to a compliance monitoring system for making
an infrastructure appear compliant even when the underlying system is
not compliant. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach is viable
in large networks.
1 Introduction
Determining the compliance level of a system to a set of infrastructure policies
is an important component in the overall assessment of the security of an or-
ganization. Infrastructure policies aim to prevent safety and security problems
by specifying the correct operational conditions of systems within certain pre-
scribed safety thresholds. Such policies are specified by organizations such as the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [10] to define the proper
security configuration of enterprise systems, and by organizations managing crit-
ical infrastructure systems such as power grids or airport computer networks [6]
to define safe, secure and reliable operations of the critical infrastructure. The
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) defines infrastructure
security policies for the power grid [8] which mandate that all devices critical
to the operation of the grid need to be placed within a hardened electronic se-
curity perimeter defined by firewalls. Non-compliance with these policies might
expose vulnerable devices to remote exploitation. In airport systems, infrastruc-
ture policies might specify that an aircraft should be able to access airline servers
for downloading software updates only when it is parked at the gate securely.
Violation of this policy are potential indicators of erroneous configurations of
the system which can reduce the safety margin of operations.
Generally, policy violations are detected during periodic auditing or through
the use of management systems that monitor the system’s conditions. Policy
monitoring systems [7] are designed to detect operation of a system in conditions
that are not compliant with policies. Such conditions are detected by integrating
incoming information from a variety of network monitoring devices and other
monitoring software designed to observe specific characteristics of the system
such as running programs, or the position of a device in a pervasive space. The
integration of such information composes a view of the system’s state relevant
to the policy compliance process. However, the state of the system observed by
the the monitoring process might not be consistent with the actual state of the
infrastructure: errors in the detection of security-relevant events and malicious
information provided by compromised devices can inject false state data into
the compliance validation process and conceal that the infrastructure is actually
operating in unsafe conditions.
In this paper we introduce techniques for assessing the robustness of an in-
frastructure to errors in the monitoring process. The evaluation of robustness
permits the detection of situations where the infrastructure is potentially operat-
ing in unsafe conditions, even if it appears to operate within the tolerance limits
defined by policies. When such situations are detected, we produce a report that
specifies the exact conditions required to trigger the violation. Administrators
can then verify these possible violations and take corrective actions.
We consider two types of errors in the monitoring process: non-malicious
omissions or delay of events caused by availability problems in the devices that
observe the system’s state, and malicious injection of false information about the
system’s state from compromised devices. The analysis of the robustness to the
omission or falsification of data is performed by computing sequences of events
such as the installation of new software, the discovery of a new vulnerability, or
the change of a firewall configuration that can result in a policy violation. We
identify the critical sequences that, if not detected, would hide the fact that the
infrastructure is operating in critical conditions. Using this information we can
actively check the state of the system to verify that events did not occur, and
we can preemptively configure the system to prevent such events from occurring
in the future. The analysis of the resilience of the monitoring infrastructure
to compromise of devices identifies a set of critical devices that if compromised,
would allow an attacker to conceal the fact that the system is operating in unsafe
conditions. Administrators can use this information to develop a gameplan that
acquires these critical pieces of information redundantly through independent
channels to increase the system’s trust level.
Our approach is based on analyzing the state of the system to determine its
distance from a state violating a policy. We express a policy as a set of conditions
over the state, and we define the distance from a violation as the number of
conditions in the policy which are not satisfied in the current state. We call this
set the robustness set. By analyzing the robustness sets, we compute the minimal
set of actions that would lead to a violation and the minimum number of devices
that must be compromised to conceal a violation from detection.
The contributions of this paper include:
1. The definition of the concept of distance from violations as a way to measure
the robustness of a system to errors in the monitoring process
2. Two techniques for computing the robustness of the state of the infrastructure
to errors and to attacks directed toward the monitoring process.
3. An evaluation of the scalability of our techniques
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes work re-
lated to the analysis of system robustness. Section 3 introduces our formalism
for specifying the configuration of a system and for specifying policies. Section 4
introduces the concepts of robustness of compliance and the algorithms for com-
puting critical events and critical devices. Section 5 provides an experimental
evaluation of the performance of our algorithm. Finally, Section 6 concludes our
work and discusses future directions.
2 Related Work
The use of infrastructure policies for the specification of the security of a system
has been proposed by several authors. Fenz and Ekelhart [3] analyze how we
can formalize policy requirements and mechanisms using an ontology to show
the compliance of a system design. Anwar and Campbell [1] formalize policy
requirements using logic and validate the system design for compliance. Previous
work [7] introduced a scalable dynamic monitoring of security configurations to
detect policy violations at runtime. This work extends this line of research by
analyzing the consequences of errors in the monitoring process.
Security metrics have been presented as methods for analyzing the security
state of an infrastructure system. For example, an attack tree analysis [9] pro-
vides an analysis of the security of a configuration by identifying possible attack
vectors and their effects on the system. In our policy-based compliance analysis
we express policies which can rely on the computation of logic attack trees. Ad-
ditionally, this paper focuses on potential errors in the monitoring process. An
algorithm for efficiently computing the security consequences of changes in the
configurations of a systems have been proposed [11]. Such analysis is designed to
compare different choices at design time and does not take into account errors
in the monitoring process.
Probabilistic attack trees aim at providing a probabilistic estimation of the
security of a network. Xie et. al. [12] propose to analyze the security of a system
by modeling the uncertainties about the difficulty in exploiting vulnerabilities
and about the runtime behavior of the attacker using a Bayesian network. Our
work considers general policy violations which are not restricted to security
attacks as they can represent safety and reliability requirements. Additionally,
we identify events and devices critical to the compliance of the system. This
enables administrators to take preemptive actions and correct security problems
before an attack occurs.
Recent work in the context of access control by Lee and Yu [4] provides a
framework to reason about partial proof of access control authorizations. Among
the feature of the framework, it provides the ability to identify users which are
“almost” authorized to perform an action on a resource, even if their authoriza-
tion is not complete. While the concept of “distance from violation” is similar,
the access control framework is not directly applicable at policy compliance.
Additionally, we provide algorithms for the computation of critical events and
critical devices.
3 Policy Compliance Monitoring
Policy compliance is an essential security and regulatory requirement for infras-
tructure systems. Policies codify a set of rules that can help to prevent unde-
sirable conditions which could lead to undesired consequences such as system
compromises or reduced safety margins for critical systems. We focus on a set
of policies that regulate valid security configurations and operational conditions
of the computing infrastructure of large organizations and critical infrastructure
systems. Such policies are defined by several government bodies and by many
large organizations. For instance, NIST provides a set of policies which the com-
puting infrastructure of government organizations must comply with [10]. These
policies control the type of software that can run on machines, mandate the in-
stallation of anti-virus software or the use of VPN connections, and regulate the
use of USB memory drives. NERC is another government entity which specifies
policies about the configuration of power grid systems. For example, one NERC
policy requires that all remote access point to the system must be monitored and
logged at all times; and all critical systems need to be placed within an enclosed
electronic security perimeter. Policies are not restricted to security configura-
tions. Domain-specific policies can be used to specify valid conditions of specific
types of systems. For example, a policy in the context of airport infrastructure
systems could require aircrafts to access remote airline applications only when
they are parked at the gate [6].
While policy compliance cannot guarantee security or detect all unsafe sit-
uations, compliance to a well-designed set of policies is considered a first step
toward securing a system against attack that would be avoidable had proper
security measures been taken, and can be used to detect erroneous operating
conditions before the system enters an unsafe state.
Fig. 1. Monitoring architecture.
Periodic auditing and monitoring systems [7] analyze the infrastructure and
detect policy violations. Once violations are detected, manual or automatic at-
tempts to correct the situation are undertaken. However, in several situations
it is desirable to have an “early warning” when a system is operating in condi-
tions close to a violation. For example, a system might be operating in conditions
where a single action from any user could lead to a critical policy violation. Avail-
ability problems in the devices detecting such actions might make the monitoring
system unaware that the system is operating outside policy specifications. De-
tecting such situations allows preemptive reconfiguration of the system to disable
dangerous actions to reduce the risk of entering into a critical state.
Additionally, incorrect information provided by a single unprotected device
can hide a dangerous operating condition from detection. By detecting such
critical pieces of information, we can guide the process of information acquisition
to increase the trustworthiness of information.
Our architecture is composed of a set of software agents or devices that
provide observations about the state of the system relevant to policy valida-
tion to one (or more) monitoring servers, as shown in Figure 1. For example,
some critical portions of the system’s state can include the list of running pro-
grams on each host, the list of active network connections between hosts, firewall
rules, and application-level information such as the list of authorized users of
web-application applications. Network management software such as WBEM or
SNMP are able to acquire part of this information. Other pieces of information
are acquired through network monitoring tools or specific software agents. The
definition of policies needs to be coupled with the definition of software sensors
or devices that can observe the information useful for its validation.
Determination of the relevant policy compliance events to detect depends
on the type of policies that the monitoring system is tracking. For security
configuration monitoring, such events can be the installation of new programs
by users or administrator, changes in firewall configurations, or the connection
of new devices. All these events can alter the security stance of the system,
and some of them might make the system violate the conditions specified by the
policies. For example, a change in a firewall configuration that makes a vulnerable
program accessible from the Internet would violate policies which specify that
it should not be possible to compromise critical systems by exploiting known
vulnerabilities.
3.1 Definition of Policies
We represent the state of the system as a set of facts expressed using Datalog.
For example, we encode the statement that a machine m1 is running a program
p that binds to port 80 using a Datalog ground predicate (fact) binds(m1, p, 80).
These facts about the system are generated through observations of the actual
state performed by entities called sensors. A sensor could be a hardware device
or a software program. For example, the fact above can be generated by software
running on the machine m1, or by port scanning software running on a machine
m2 that port scanned m1. For the purpose of policy compliance, we are not
required to observe and represent the entire state of the system. We only need
to observe the state relevant to the process of policy compliance. Events evolve
the state of the system over time. The compliance monitoring system integrates
events over time and reconstructs a representation of the ephemeral state.
Policies are expressed using Datalog rules. Datalog rules represent implica-
tions defined over the state of the infrastructure. The conditions of these impli-
cations are specified by a conjunction of predicates with variables. Predicates are
matched (i.e., unified) with the facts representing the state, and if the condition
is true a new fact is added to the state of the system. Upper-case characters
indicate variables and lowercase characters represent entities in the system. For
example, we can consider a simple rule which specifies that critical servers should
not run applications with known vulnerabilities unless an exception is specified.
By acquiring information about the running program on each machine, annota-
tions about the importance of each server, and information about vulnerabilities,
we represent this rule by specifying that we have a violation if a critical server
provides a vulnerable service as following:
type(S, server), type(A, service),
provides(S, A), criticality(S, high), hasV uln(A, V ),
¬hasException(S, E)→ violation(r1, V ).
(1)
The last predicate, called the consequence of the rule, is specified by a pred-
icate which has variables that appear in the condition (body) of the rule. The
consequence can represent a violation as in our example, or it can represent a
new fact which can be used by other rules for validating compliance. The com-
pliance of a system to these policies is checked by considering the current state
of the system and the inference rules. A policy violation is present in the system
if a violation fact is present in the minimal model.
Policies are associated to a cost of violation. This value represents the ex-
pected impact on the infrastructure of a policy violation. For example, the cost
of violating a policy that would allow the compromise of a substation in the
power grid can be computed by estimating the cost of a potential blackout in
the area powered by the substation [2].
4 Robustness of Compliance
Policies define the operating conditions within which the system should operate.
Our robustness analysis considers these policies and the current state of the
infrastructure to identify two pieces of information: the critical sequences of
events which if not detected, would make the system operate in violations of
policies, and the set of devices which, if compromised, would hide violations
from detection.
The determination of these two sets of critical information is based upon
computation of the distance of the state of the system from a violation. This
distance is expressed as the set of predicates in the rule that would make the
system violate a policy if satisfied. We express this distance through the defini-
tion of a robustness set. Based on the robustness set, we analyze the robustness
to omitted events and robustness to compromised devices.
4.1 Robustness set
A basic step for both the determination of the set of actions which lead to
violations and the set of critical devices is the evaluation of the distance from
non-compliance of the infrastructure state.
In our framework, policies are represented as rules. The body of the rule
expresses all the conditions that need to be verified for inferring that there
is a violation of a particular policy in the system. When a system is compli-
ant to a policy, one or more of such conditions do not occur in the system’s
state. Intuitively, this set of conditions which do not occur constitutes an indi-
cation of the distance of the system from the violation of the policy. Given a
set of facts matching a portion of the rule body, we define the robustness set
as the set of predicates for which no match is found in the infrastructure con-
figuration. Each rule has several robustness sets that depend on which facts
and predicates in the body of the rule are considered. For example, a rule
p1(X, Y ), p2(Y, Z)→ violation with a system configuration p1(a1, b1), p1(a2, b2)
has two robustness sets: p2(b1, Z) if we use the substitution X/a1, Y/b1, and
p2(b2, Z) if we use the substitution X/a2, Y/b2. A set of facts matching one of
the robustness sets (e.g., p2(b1, z1)) would make the entire body of the rule true
p = policy bi,1, . . . , bi,q → hi
S=state of the system
R=robustness sets
C = {p}
for all rules c = bi,1, bi,q → hi ∈ C do
for all bi,k in bi,1, . . . , bi,q in c do
G = search in S for facts matching bi,k(X)
for all facts gk(z) in G do
p′ = c|X/z {substitute the variables X in c with the values of the fact gk}
R = R ∪ p′
C = C ∪ p′
end for
end for
C = C \ c
end for
Fig. 2. Computing the complete robustness sets for a policy p
and trigger a violation. In a more realistic example, consider a system whose state
is described by computer(c1), computer(c2), run(c1, p1) and run(c1, p2) with a
policy computer(X), run(X, P ), hasV ulnerability(P, V )→ violation resolves to
four robustness sets: {hasV ulnerability(p1, V )}, {hasV ulnerability(p2, V )},
{run(c1, P ), hasV ulnerability(P, V )}, {run(c2, P ), hasV ulnerability(P, V )}. Such
robustness set represents the cases in which a new vulnerability is discovered in
p1 or p2, or in which a new vulnerable program is run on c1 or c2.
We associate robustness sets to each policy by considering all substitutions
that match at least one predicate of the rule body with a fact in the state. The
minimal robustness set is the set with the least amount of free variables.
Robustness sets are associated with a policy by unifying different portions of
the body of the rule with facts in the system state. We consider each predicate
in the body of the rule and we find all facts in the knowledge base that unify
with such a predicate. For all matching facts, we substitute the variables in the
rule body with the values in the fact. The partially matched rule is added to the
list of robustness sets and to a candidate list of rules. We continue the analysis
by removing one of the partially matched candidate sets from the candidate list
and considering all its predicates with facts in the system. The algorithm for
associating robustness sets to each policy is shown in Figure 2. Our techniques
do not require to generate all robustness sets. Optimizations are used to reduce
the sets to consider.
4.2 Robustness to event omissions
The detection of events that affect the security state of the system might not be
complete. Faults can temporarily disconnect monitoring devices from the net-
work, and software or configuration errors can make the system miss important
events. For this reason, the representation of the system’s state collected by the
monitoring system might not be consistent with the actual state of the system:
even when it appears that the system is operating in safe (i.e., policy-compliant)
conditions, the actual infrastructure might in fact be in violation of the policy
because a single critical event has been missed. Our technique takes the state
collected at the monitoring server and finds such critical sequences of events.
Using this knowledge, administrators can verify that such events did not occur
in the past, and they can reconfigure the system so that such events cannot
occur in the future.
Actions The determination of the critical sequences of events is performed by
modeling events relevant to policy compliance and by analyzing the robustness
sets of each policy. From the robustness set, we identify the sequences that lead to
violations. Events that change the configuration of the system are represented as
actions. Actions are hypothetical modifications of the state of the system and we
represent them by adding or removing facts from the overall state. For example,
to represent the action of running a new program p1 on machine m1, we add a
fact run(m1, p1) to the state of the system. We call such facts added or removed
temporarily to the state the consequences of the action. Often, actions can be
applied only if certain conditions are verified in the system. For example, we can
run a new program only if the machine m1 is active. We represent this fact using
preconditions. A precondition is a set of conditions about the state that needs
to be satisfied for the action to be possible.
We represent actions as a list of preconditions and a list of consequences.The
preconditions are separated by the consequences with the operator ⇒. The ac-
tion of adding a new fact is represented by using by prefixing + before the
predicate, while the removal of a fact is represented by prefixing − before the
predicate. For example, the action of running a new program is represented as
computer(X), program(Y )⇒ +run(X, Y ).
Similarly, we can express the fact that an unknown vulnerability is discovered
in an installed program using an action as follows:
computer(X), software(SW ), hasInstalled(X, SW ),
vulnerability(V )⇒ +hasV ul(SW, V ),
(2)
Actions represent the security events that might be not detected by the
monitoring system. The missed detection of events can occur for several reasons.
For example, malfunctioning or maintenance on a network monitoring device
might cause network packets to be not analyzed for a short period of time.
Events occurring during the downtime period might have not been detected.
Events happen with different frequencies in the system. Running a new vul-
nerable program is likely to happen on a user machine, but less likely to happen
on a controlled server. A short downtime of a sensor has a larger chance to miss
a frequent event rather then a very rare event. Because many different sequences
of actions can lead to violations, we are interested in finding only the most prob-
able sequences. We represent the likelihood of an event to occur by associating
actions with a score s. To simplify the composition of the score of different ac-
tions, we assume that they are independent. We define the robustness to changes
of a policy given a configuration as the composition of the score of the actions
that can lead to a violation of the policy. For example, the actions that repre-
sent the discovery of a previously unknown vulnerability can be associated with
a score s that represent an estimation that a new vulnerability is discovered in
a program within a specified time interval. Scores for each action are computed
by observing the frequency with which events occur in the system.
Analysis Once the possible actions are specified, the robustness to events of a
policy is computed by finding the sequences of actions that lead to a violation.
We call these sequences critical action sequences. A naive computation of these
sequences can be performed by applying all possible sequences of actions to the
state and identifying the ones that lead to a violation of the policy. However,
even when we limit the length of sequences by removing the ones whose score
is below a predefined threshold, the unguided search remains computationally
intractable as the size of the network increases.
We use the robustness set to guide the search for the critical action sequences.
The robustness sets provides the minimal sets of predicates that should be re-
moved or added to the system for a policy to be violated. We reduce the search
space by considering only actions that affect the robustness set of the policy, and
we reduce the length of the sequences of actions by ignoring sequences whose
probability goes below a predetermined threshold.
The sequence of critical events for the policy is found by analyzing the ro-
bustness sets in order of increasing size (i.e., we consider first the robustness
sets with a small amount of free variables). We consider the actions whose con-
sequences match with one of the predicates in the robustness set and we call
this set A′. We search within the set A′ for all sequences of actions that lead
to a violation, but we stop if the combined score of the actions goes below a
set threshold. The threshold represents the maximum number of events that we
assume can be lost at any point in time. If a sequence is found, we add it to
the list of critical sequences. If sequence over the threshold is found, the robust-
ness set is added to a set D of strong robustness sets. A critical sequence for
the set must also contain a critical sequence for the strong robustness set. Since
this critical sequence could not be found in this case, any set that contains a
strong robustness set has no critical sequence. This observation allows skipping
the analysis of a large number of robustness sets.
By combining the scores of the critical sequences we obtain a measure of the
robustness of each policy to critical events. The integration of this score with the
cost of violation provides a estimation of risk. Additionally, the critical sequences
can be used to reconfigure the system and prevent such events from happening,
or for checking if these events have already happened.
For example, we can consider a policy in an airport infrastructure system
stating that a network devices should not be used near specific restricted areas
around the aircrafts during refueling. When the aircraft is not refueling and no
devices are located in the restricted areas, the system needs two events for enter-
ing in a policy-violating state (i.e., moving a network device in the restricted area
and starting refueling operation). When a network device enters the restricted
area, then only one event is sufficient for the policy to be violated (i.e., starting
the refueling operations). The computation of the robustness to event omission
would detect this condition and notify in advance the refueling process that it
cannot start until the network devices are out of the restricted areas.
4.3 Robustness to compromised devices
The second component of the robustness of a configuration measures its resilience
to the compromise of devices. An infrastructure system operating outside the
conditions specified by the policies is potentially operating in unsafe conditions.
Malware can be used on compromised devices to provide false information to the
monitoring system and hide the presence of a violation. In this condition, unless
the information about the state of the system is obtained independently through
other sensors, the monitoring system would be unable to detect a violation.
Our technique computes a minimal set of devices that is necessary to compro-
mise in order to hide violations from detection. We rely on the robustness sets to
identify how close the system is to a violation and whether information required
to show the presence of a violation is provided by a single device. Such devices
are called critical devices because, if compromised they would enable an attacker
to conceal a violation of the policy. For assuring that the system is operating
within the policies, the information collected by critical devices should be ver-
ified independently through other sensors, and the security state of the critical
devices should be verified to ensure that the sensor has not been compromised.
The identification of critical devices is performed by considering the data that
are potentially generated by each device. We compare this information with the
robustness sets of each policy. If the entire robustness set can be generated by a
single device, the device must be critical.
Sensors and Facts Sensors observe the state of the system and represent it as
Datalog facts. We can associate each ground predicate pred(a1, . . . , an) with the
sensor sources s producing it. We indicate this association with an additional
argument s, as in pred(a1, . . . , an, s).
Each sensor generates a specific set of facts about the system. A network
monitoring device provides information about network flows and communication
patterns. A software agent running on a machine provides information about
running programs and users. Given a device, we represent the set of predicates
that it can potentially generate in a source base. A source base is a set of ground
and non-ground predicates that unify with all set of facts generated by the sensor.
For example, a software sensor s that observes the software running on a machine
m1 generates a fact run(m1, pi, s) for each program pi running on m1. The source
base Gs associated with the sensor contains the predicate Gs = {run(m1, P, s)}.
In another example, if a similar sensor s′ collects information from two different
machines, the source base is Gs = {run(m1, P, s
′), run(m2, P, s
′)}.
Devices can provide redundant information about the system. For example,
in an airport system, the location of an aircraft is provided by GPS devices
located on the aircraft itself and by the ground radar of the airport. We indicate
such redundancy by saying that two sensors are equivalent.
Analysis The analysis of robustness determines if compromising one sensor is
sufficient for hiding a violation. A device is critical for a robustness set if it
is possible to unify the set with the source base, i.e., if all predicates in the
robustness set can be matched with predicates in the source base.
Generally, we can assume that monitoring systems are aware of sensors that
are currently employed in the system. For performing the analysis, we take each
robustness set (in order of increasing size) and we check if it is possible to match it
with each of the source bases. If the match is possible, then the device associated
with the source base is critical. The analysis provides a list of the critical devices
associated with each policy. Such critical devices can be analyzed to assure that
they are not compromised or under the control of malicious users.
For example, we consider an airport scenario and a policy specifying that
aircrafts must be at the gate for updating their software systems. The sensors
providing information about the location of the aircraft are the aircraft GPS and
the control tower, while information about the fact that the aircraft is updating
software is provided by the airline servers. In this case, when the aircraft is at
the gate we obtain a robustness set including statements requiring the state
of the software update. Hence, the airline servers are critical devices in these
conditions. On the other side, when the aircraft is updating, the aircraft and the
control tower are not critical devices: a compromise of one of the two devices
would be detected by checking the inconsistency of the location information.
Different policies can be associated with different costs of violations. We can
rank devices according to the importance of the policies by considering the sum
of the costs of violations of all the policies for which the devices are critical.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In the experimental evaluation of our technique, we measure its applicability in
realistic scenarios by creating simulated configurations of network systems and
evaluating the time required for the analysis. We implemented the system in
Java 1.5 using Jena [5]. We ran the experiments on 10 networks of 50 to 500
nodes and the corresponding results are the average timings over 10 execution
runs on each of the networks on a 2.8 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon system.
Our first experiment measures the scalability of the algorithm for computing
robustness to event omission. For our experiments we evaluated the robustness
of an enterprise network. The complete network architecture is composed of a
variable number of hosts organized in four networks: the public Internet, a DMZ
area, the enterprise network, and a SCADA network. Interconnections between
networks are protected by firewalls that only allow traffic to specific services (e.g.
http or ssh). Each host runs services that are might have software vulnerabilities.
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Fig. 3. Time required for computing robustness to event omissions.
Our policies specify that there is a violation if it is possible to compromise a host
from the Internet by exploiting a vulnerability.
We classify configurations of the system into three classes: violation, robust
to one event, robust to two or more events. We compare our algorithm for the
computation of the critical events with a baseline obtained by applying each pos-
sible event and evaluating the presence of violations. We consider three types of
events: discovery of a new software vulnerability in an installed software packages
(e.g., a zero-day attack), change in the connection between devices to networks
(e.g., a device under the control of the attacker connected to different networks),
and running a new software on a device. Our algorithm outperforms the baseline
for large networks: we are able to identify critical events within a few seconds
even in networks composed of hundred of devices. These results are shown in
Figure 3.
The second experiment evaluates the computation of robustness to device
compromises. While this algorithm is similar to the computation of event omis-
sions, we cannot easily discard robustness sets which are not relevant for the
analysis in the event-omission algorithm. This fact increases the time required
for the analysis. In these conditions, a near real-time computation of the critical
devices can be performed only on networks of about 100 hosts. This computation
takes an average of 2.87 seconds. For larger networks, the computation needs to
be performed oﬄine. For a 300-host network, the computation of the critical
devices requires an average of 111 seconds.
6 Conclusion
Compliance-monitoring system cannot always provide a complete view of the
security of the system. Undetected events or compromises of devices can hide
from monitoring the fact that a system is operating in conditions which are not
compliant with policies and, hence, potentially unsafe.
This work introduced techniques for analyzing the robustness of the security
configuration of a system to undetected events and compromised devices. We
identify and quantify critical sequences of events that need to be detected to
avoid operating outside compliance, and we identify critical information that
needs to be acquired from devices for preventing attackers from hiding unsafe
conditions of the infrastructure. The knowledge of such events and such devices
can be used for evaluating risks and for reconfiguring the system to avoid entering
such unsafe states. We showed that our approach can be applied to enterprise
network systems and airport infrastructure systems.
Future work will introduce several optimizations in the computation of device-
compromise robustness. We are going to use the source base of each sensor to
guide the generation of only robustness sets relevant for the determination of
the critical devices. Additionally, we are planning to integrate these techniques
in a policy-monitoring system for airport infrastructure. Using the monitoring
system, we will evaluate these techniques in a real scenario. Finally, future work
is going to investigate the use of the critical event sequences for planning pre-
emptive protective actions, and the use of the list of critical devices for perform-
ing online analyses of the security of such devices.
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